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Distributed connectionists models of reasoning
must solve the problem of multiple instantiation
for two reasons. First, reasoning can involve two
or more instantiations of the same predicate or
object. Second, in a distributed representation,
two closely related concepts must share common
resources or nodes. Reasoning with these two
concepts requires that nodes pertaining to them
be instantiated twice. This paper presents a model
(INFERNET) that uses temporal synchrony
variable binding. It proposes a particular
solution to the problem of multiple instantiation
that involves the use of different oscillation
frequencies. This solution implies some
predictions. These predictions are tested on
human participants, and the results are presented
here. They confirm model predictions.
Introduction
Multiple instantiation involves the simultaneous
use of the same parts of the knowledge base in
different ways. Knowing that “John is in love with
Rita” and that “Rita is in love with John”, you can
easily infer that they should be happy. To arrive at
that conclusion you had to instantiate the predicate
“is in love with” and the objects “John” and “Rita”
twice. Precisely how this is done, especially in
distributed systems, is the problem of multiple
instantiation.
Models that load copies of pieces of knowledge
into a working area before transforming them do
not have any problem with multiple instantiation.
They simply make several copies of the same
content from the Long Term Knowledge Base.
However, for connectionists models that use the
structure of the knowledge base itself  as the place
where concepts are associated, transformed and
where inferences are drawn, multiple instantiation
is a serious problem. How can the same part of the
knowledge base be associated with different things
at the same time without making several copies of
the knowledge in question? This question is crucial
for connectionist models of working memory and
reasoning. Multiple instantiation is an even greater
problem for distributed representations. Two
closely related concepts will, at least in principle,
have some parts or nodes in common. If these two
concepts are needed at the same time, their common
parts must be instantiated twice.
The connectionist model of reasoning presented
here, INFERNET, implements a working memory
that is the activated part of long term memory.
This is achieved by  making use of temporal
properties of the node spikes. A particular solution
of the problem of multiple instantiation is
proposed. This model makes predictions that have
been tested experimentally and the results of these
experiments are reported here. These results
challenge modular models of memory.
Temporal synchrony variable
binding systems
Systems that achieve variable binding through
temporal synchrony attempt to solve the binding
problem through the use of temporal properties of
node firing. In short, when one node fires in
synchrony with another, they are temporarily bound
together. This technique is successfully able to
represent n-ary predicates. This idea has been
successfully applied to “reflexive” reasoning
(Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993), to natural language
parsing (Henderson, 1994), to analogical inferences




INFERNET is a connectionist model whose nodes
employ an integrate-and-fire principle. Each concept
is represented by a cluster of nodes firing in
synchrony (figure 1). Concepts can be bound
together by the same type of synchrony. For
example, to represent the concept “red rose”, nodes
belonging to “red” should fire in synchrony with
nodes belonging to “rose” (figure 1). There is
neurobiological evidence for considering synchrony
as a possible binding mechanism in the brain. In
particular, this phenomenon has been observed
between distant cells in the same cortical area
(Gray, König, Engel & Singer, 1989), between
cells in different cortical areas (Eckhorn, Bauer,
Jordan, Brosch, Kruse, Munk & Reitboeck, 1988)
and even between cells in different hemispheres
(Engel, König, Kreiter & Singer, 1991). Engel,
König, Gray & Singer (1990) have shown that
individual cells can rapidly change partners of
synchrony. Moreover the absence of
synchronization has been observed to impair
abilities (Lowell & Singer, 1992).
Discrimination
Discrimination is achieved by successive
synchronies, for example, to discriminate a red rose
on a green lawn. The nodes belonging to “red” and
“rose” must fire in synchrony and those
corresponding to “green” and “lawn” must fire in
synchrony, but these two sets of nodes must fire in
succession in order to be distinguished (figure 1).
Engel, Kreiter, König & Singer (1991) provide
evidence that shows that if several objects are
present in a scene, several group of cells are
grouped in distinct windows of synchrony.
First constraints
A number of neurobiological parameters are
involved in this type of representation. The first is
the frequency of oscillation. In INFERNET, as in
SHRUTI (Shastri & Ajjanagadde 1993), once a
node is activated, it tends to fire rhythmically at a
frequency of from 30 to 100 Hz. The temporal gap
between 2 spikes of a node is therefore from 10 to
33 ms. Certain types of neurons oscillate at a
frequency of 30 to 100 Hz (γ wave).  These γ
waves have been observed to be associated with
attention (Wang & Rinzel, 1995) and with
associative memory (Wilson & Shepherd, 1995).
Both attention and associative memory are required
by reasoning. The second parameter is the precision
of the synchrony. This precision is about 5 ms
(Abeles & al., 1993).
Windows of synchrony
How are successive synchronies differentiated?
SHRUTI uses the activation of special kind nodes
(τ-and nodes) that indicate boundaries of the
rhythmic oscillation of predicates, and thereby, the
limits of synchronies. INFERNET, on the other
hand, uses the distribution of node-firing times.
Since concepts are represented by a set of nodes, we
focus on when firing occurs. If the firing
distribution is tightly concentrated about the mean,
the concept is considered to be activated. In Figure
1, nodes corresponding to the concept “rose” are
firing in synchrony and the firing time distribution
is concentrated around the mean. Nodes pertaining
to “rose” fire in synchrony with nodes representing
“red”. This synchrony is distinguished from the
synchrony between nodes pertaining to “green” and















Figure 1: The “red rose on the green lawn” requires
binding of concepts “red” and “rose”, succeded
immediately by “green” and “lawn”.
Predicates
Predicates and arguments are represented by
successive synchronies. To represent “Mary is taller
than Georges”, we need the abstract relation IS-
TALLER (p, q) and we must bind “Mary” to p
and “Georges” to q. We also need 3 successive
windows of synchrony: the first contains “is-taller”,
the second contains “p” and “Mary”, and the third
contains “q” and “Georges”.
Deductive inferences
Deriving inferences requires the addition and
replacement of synchronies. For example from
“Mary is taller than Georges” and “Georges is taller
than Barbara”, the system should be able to
conclude that “Mary is taller than Barbara”. Figure
2 shows the binding of the predicate arguments and
the adding and replacement of synchronies. This is
achieved by a set of excitatory and inhibitory links,
by a set of presynaptic amplification and inhibition
links, and by delays assigned to connections. A
complete description of the structure of links and
delays can be found in Sougné (in preparation).
Note that transitions between sequences require
more steps than are represented in the Figure 2.
When the system receives a question, it must
bind the instantiated arguments to the generic
arguments in the rule. In the first premise of the
previous example, “Mary” must be bound to p,
“Georges” to q, and “Barbara” to r. So, when the
rule derives the conclusion, activation is
transmitted to the instantiated arguments. This
causes them to fire in synchrony with the argument
slots of the rule. In Figure 2, “Mary” is bound to
p, “Georges” to q and “Barbara” to r. When the rule
infers that p  is taller then r , p  and r  must be
correctly bound to “Mary” and “Barbara”. This
requires a form of learning, an adjustment of
connection strengths and transmission delays. In















Figure 2: Bindings of the query content to the
rule slots and replacement by the sequence
represent ing  t rans i t ive  in ference .
A: Representation of the fact: Is-taller (Mary,
Georges); every concept is instantiated once.
B:  Representation of the facts: Is-taller (Mary,
Georges) and Is-taller (Georges, Barbara). Is-
taller, q and Georges are instantiated twice.
C: Representation of the transitive inference:
Is-taller (Mary, Barbara)
Maintenance of working memory
How can this representation be maintained in
working memory? The problem with γ waves is
that they persist only a few hundred milliseconds.
This is not long enough to reflect the time taken
by people to draw inferences, nor does it correspond
to standard estimates of working memory retention
time (10 to 20 seconds). For this reason, following
Lisman & Idiart (1995), γ waves in INFERNET
are nested inside θ waves [3 - 7 Hz] whose duration
can exceed 10 seconds. The resulting pattern
consists of  a bursting wave nested in a longer
wave. The resulting temporal firing pattern for a
single node is shown in Figure 3. There is
neurobiological evidence for  this rhythm in
working memory. θ waves have been observed to
be associated with working memory tasks
(Nakamura, Mikami & Kubota, 1992). The node
shown fires at 50 Hz for the seven spikes that
constitutes a burst. This is followed by a resting
period of 60 ms. Thereafter, the burst begins again.
The burst interval is about  200 ms (5 Hz).
200 ms 
Time
20 ms    
wave 50 Hz.γ θ wave 5 Hz.
Figure 3: γ wave nested in θ wave
Multiple instantiation
To complete the model, we need a mechanism able
to do multiple instantiation.  As mentioned in the
introduction, models that load copies of parts of
Long Term Memory content into a Working
Memory buffer can equally well make one or many
copies of the same content. However, a model that
does not employ this loading process and views
Working Memory as the active part of Long Term
Memory, must still be able to do multiple
instantiation. Mani & Shastri  (1993) use a set of
copies  of the predicate and its argument slots. In
their model, SHRUTI, activation is directed to an
uninstantiated copy by a switch. SHRUTI predicts
that the time for propagating multiple instantiation
is proportional to the number of copies. However,
this prediction seems contradicted by some
experimental data.
Some experimental data shows that at least
double instantiation is handled without any
problem by human participants. Clark (1969)
studied the performance of participants with
transitive inference. His data reveal no difference in
processing time between problems with doubly
instantiated predicate and problems with singly
instantiated predicates. In other words, this would
seem to imply that there is, in fact, no cost in
terms of additional processing time for double
instantiation. This property will emerge naturally
from the underlying assumptions of INFERNET.
The present model modifies the frequency of the
γ wave to enable multiple instantiation. This
means that neurons pertaining to a concept doubly
instantiated will oscillate twice as fast as singly
instantiated ones. The double instantiation of the
predicate “is taller” and the objects “Georges” and
“q” is illustrated in Figure 2.
If we assume a γ wave frequency between 30
and 100 Hz., multiple instantiation should be
limited around 3 with little or no additional cost for
the system. While some nodes could fire at 30 Hz.,
double instantiated ones could fire at 60 Hz., and
triple instantiated at 90 Hz. Our model suggests
also that the brain does multiple instantiation by
replacing a number of windows of synchrony by a
single “chunked” one. If the number of
instantiations exceeds 3, there will be an increase of
processing time whose increase will be
proportional to the difficulty of “chunking”.
Sougné (1996) (experiment 2) proposed a
relational reasoning task to human participants.
The first group of participants received these
premises:
“Allan is in love with Mary”,
“Mary is in love with Allan”,
“Peter is in love with Barbara”,
”Barbara is in love with Peter”.
The second group received these premises:
“Peter is in love with Mary”,
“Barbara is in love with Allan”,
“Allan is in love with Mary”
“Mary is in love with Peter”.
After reading these premises, participants had to
infer which people were happy (i.e. where their
love was reciprocated). A higher proportion of
subjects gave the correct answer in the first group
where relations are all reciprocal (.92), than in the
second group (.66). Response times for correct
responses were also significantly shorter for the
first group (mean: 3719 ms) than for the second
(mean: 7778 ms).
For the first group where all relations are
reciprocal, subjects can rapidly replace the relation
“is in love with” by “love each other”, and finally,
by “are happy”, therefore reducing the number of
instantiations. By contrast, in the second group,
subjects need to distinguish items for which the
“love each other” relation is true from items for
which this relation is false and maintain this
distinction in working memory, before enabling the
replacement process. This additional process takes
time, explaining the significantly higher responses.
This experiment shows that constraints on the
replacement process impair cognitive abilities. It
also shows that at least double instantiation is
handled efficiently, because the replacement process
in this experiment involves simultaneously using
at least two instantiations of concepts. For
example: “Mary is in love with Allan” and “Allan
is in love with Mary” must be considered
simultaneously to be replaced by “Allan and Mary
love each other”.
For a distributed connectionist model, multiple
instantiation should also affect related concepts.
Concepts that share properties most likely share
something in the neurobiological substrate. The
effect of multiple instantiation should be
observable when related concepts are used together.
The following experiment tests this hypothesis.
Experiment
In a distributed connectionist model, a single
concept is represented by a large set of nodes. In
INFERNET a concept is represented by a set of
nodes firing in synchrony. The distributed nature of
each concept implies that closely related concepts
have some nodes in common. If in an episode of
reasoning, two related concepts are needed and if
they cannot belong to the same window of
synchrony, the nodes that they share must be
instantiated twice. In the present experiment the
number of closely related concepts was
manipulated. The prediction was that if the number
of instantiations of shared properties exceeded 3, a
replacement process would be triggered. This
replacement must take time and would be reflected
in the subjects’ response time.
Participants and design
The 40 subjects were undergraduate psychology
majors. They were randomly assigned to each of
two conditions. These two conditions differed in the
amount that the concepts used in the experiment
shared common properties.
Material
Two rules of the type A⊃B (material implication),
one for each condition, were constructed. These
rules have the same length. The first rule involved
rather distant concepts: “If the lumberjack cuts
down the oak tree, the farmer’s tractor can use the
pathway”. The second rule used more closely related
concepts: “If the lumberjack cuts down the oak tree,
the carpenter can nail the oak boards”. In the latter
rule, there are 7 concepts related to wood. Four
questions for each condition were designed. For the
first condition: “The lumberjack cut down the oak
tree. What do you conclude?” “The lumberjack
didn’t cut down the oak tree. What do you
conclude?” “The farmer’s tractor can use the
pathway. What do you conclude?” “The farmer’s
tractor can’t use the pathway. What do you
conclude?”
For the second condition: “The lumberjack cut
down the oak tree. What do you conclude?” “The
lumberjack didn’t cut down the oak tree. What do
you conclude?” “The carpenter can nail the oak
boards. What do you conclude?” “The carpenter
can’t nail the oak boards. What do you conclude?”
The four questions and the rule correspond to
the following logical forms: A⊃B, A; A⊃B, ~A;
A⊃B, B; A⊃B, ~B. All material was presented by a
computer program allowing response times to be
recorded. Participants’ conclusions were recorded
manually.
Procedure
Each participant was facing the monitor. One of the
rules appeared on the screen. Participants were
asked to read the rule and to indicate when they had
understood it. The rule stayed on the screen during
the entire experiment. Questions appeared on the
screen, one at the time and in random order.
Participants had to answer each question while the
computer recorded the reaction time. Before
presenting the experimental material, participants
received training exercises with the same procedure,
but with an arithmetic content.
Results and discussion
There was a highly significant difference of mean
reaction time for equivalent responses on answering
the first question presented (Mann-Whitney Z =
2.994, p= 0.002). The mean for the first group was
3499 ms. and for the second group 4893 ms. All
other differences of reaction time were not
significant.
There is no difference for subjects reading one
rule or another, but when they receive the first
question, they must encode the rule in a particular
way permitting the inference to be drawn. This
encoding requires dealing with multiply instantiated
properties that share the concepts used in the rules.
A replacement process is required, “the lumberjack
cuts down the oak tree” must be assigned to a
unique antecedent object, or window of synchrony.
The two different consequents: “The farmer’s tractor
can use the pathway” and “The carpenter’s helper
can nail the oak boards” must also be assigned to a
single consequent object or window of synchrony.
For this consequent part there is a difference:
concepts in the sentence: “The carpenter’s helper
can’t nail the oak boards” share properties with each
other and with those used in the antecedent part of
the rule. Multiple instantiations of these shared
properties impair the replacement process and the
time for answering the question increases. When
next questions appear, this replacement has already
been solved, and the reaction times are no longer
different. The reaction time difference for the first
question is not due to the type of question that is
seen. The four different questions appear in random
order for each participant and there is no significant
differences in reaction time between the two groups
for each of the inference drawn A, ~A, B and ~B.
The only difference between the two groups occurs
for the first question - when encoding occurs.
There is another fact that reinforces the idea that
the only difference between groups involves
multiple instantiation. There is no difference of
frequency between groups related to the conclusions
inferred.
INFERNET predicts that multiple instantiation
does not require additional processing time as long
as the number of instantiations does not exceed 2 or
3. This prediction is confirmed by the results of
Clark (1969) and challenge SHRUTI’s prediction
that processing time is proportional to the number
of instantiated objects. When the number of
instances exceeds 2 or 3, INFERNET predicts a
replacement process which requires additional
processing time. INFERNET also predicts that
dealing with closely related concepts will require
multiple instantiation. The results of the present
experiment confirms this hypothesis. These results
would seem to support distributed concept
representations and challenge modular accounts of
memory. For these models (e.g. Baddeley, 1986),
Working Memory is separated from Long Term
Memory and the contents of LTM are loaded into
WM when needed. According to modular memory
models, multiple instantiation must not increase
reaction time. The results reported here contradict
this prediction.
Conclusions
For connectionist models of reasoning that do not
separate Working Memory from Long Term
Memory, the problem of multiple instantiation is a
serious one.
The model presented here, INFERNET, is a
temporal synchrony variable binding model that
uses multiple oscillation frequencies to solve the
problem of multiple instantiation. Nodes
instantiated twice oscillate twice as fast as singly
instantiated nodes.  The model predicts multiple
instantiations to be limited to 2 or 3 before an
increase in processing time is observed. When more
than 2 or 3 instantiations are needed, INFERNET
replaces the bindings of a pair of multiply
instantiated objects, with a single chunked one.
This replacement process increases processing time.
INFERNET also predicts the same effect for closely
related concepts.
Experimental data have been presented that
would seem to confirm INFERNET’s predictions.
Experimental data presented here would also
seem to challenge modular accounts of long term
memory and working memory. These models
suppose that copies of the long term memory
content are loaded into working memory. These
models predict no cost in processing time for
multiple instantiation. The results presented here
show, on the contrary, that multiple instantiation
of concepts or parts of concepts, does have a cost in
processing time when the number of instantiations
exceeds a threshold of two or three.
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